Testing for Common Values in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions by Ali Hortacsu & Jakub Kastl
This work is distributed as a Discussion Paper by the 
 






SIEPR Discussion Paper No. 07-53 
 
Testing for Common Values  






University of Chicago 
 
Jakub Kastl 










Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 
Stanford University 











The Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research at Stanford University supports research bearing on 
economic and public policy issues.  The SIEPR Discussion Paper Series reports on research and policy 
analysis conducted by researchers affiliated with the Institute.  Working papers in this series reflect the views 
of the authors and not necessarily those of the Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research or Stanford 
University.  Testing for Common Values in Canadian Treasury Bill Auctions∗
Ali Horta¸ csu† Jakub Kastl‡
July 10, 2008
Abstract
We develop a test for common values in auctions in which some bidders possess information
about rivals’ bids. Information about a rival’s bid causes a bidder to bid diﬀerently when she has
a private value than when her value depends on rivals’ information. In a divisible good setting,
such as treasury bill auctions, bidders with private values who obtain information about rivals’
bids use this information only to update their prior about the distribution of residual supply.
In the model with a common value component, they also update their prior about the value of
the good being auctioned. We use these diﬀerential updating eﬀects to construct our test. The
proposed test displays good performance in Monte Carlo studies. We then apply it to data from
Canadian treasury bill market, where some bidders have to route their bids through dealers
who also submit bids on their own. We cannot reject the null hypothesis of private values in
our data for 3-months treasury bills, but we reject private values for 12-months treasury bills.
Furthermore, we use the structural model to estimate the value of customer order ﬂow to a
dealer. We ﬁnd that the extra information contained in customers’ bids leads on average to an
increase in payoﬀ equal to about 0.5 of a basis point, or 32% of the expected surplus of dealers
from participating in these auctions.
Keywords: multiunit auctions, treasury auctions, structural estimation, nonparametric
identiﬁcation and estimation, test for common value
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11 Introduction
Is the private or common valuation component more important in treasury bill auctions? Can
we use data to provide an answer? These are the two questions that we attempt to address in
this paper. Our empirical strategy is based on observations of bidders’ responses to information
revealed about their rivals: a bidder should augment her bidding strategy in a diﬀerent way when
her valuation is private and when the valuation has a common component.
The question of ﬁnding a way to distinguish between the common and private valuation paradigms
is not new to economics literature. Milgrom and Weber’s (1982) theory of equilibrium bidding in
diﬀerent auction environments motivated empirical researchers to develop formal techniques to
help them decide which valuation paradigm ﬁt their application better. For single object auctions,
Gilley and Karels (1981) were ﬁrst to propose a reduced form testing approach based on examining
how bids vary with the number of participants. For second-price sealed-bid and English auctions,
Paarsch (1991) and Bajari and Horta¸ csu (2003) employed tests for CV using standard regres-
sion techniques: under the maintained null hypothesis of independent private values and (weakly
dominant strategy) truthful bidding, bids should not respond to information about the number
of participants. Pinkse and Tan (2005) establish, however, that such a reduced form test cannot
distinguish unambiguously a CV from PV model in ﬁrst price auctions. Paarsch’s (1992) seminal
paper showed that a more detailed structural model can achieve the goal of distinguishing CV and
PV in ﬁrst-price auctions. Paarsch’s method, however, relies on parametric assumptions about
the distribution of bidder’s private information, and hence it is hard to disentangle the inﬂuence
of the parametric assumptions on the actual outcomes of the testing procedure. Our approach,
instead, will be nonparametric, building on the closely related paper by Haile, Hong and Shum
(2003) (henceforth HHS) . HHS propose a nonparametric test for common value in ﬁrst-price auc-
tions making use of variation in the number of bidders across auctions. They use nonparametric
techniques developed in recent empirical auctions literature (e.g., Laﬀont and Vuong (1995), and
Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2002)) to estimate the distribution of valuations given the observed
bids, under the null hypothesis of private values. In particular, their theory predicts a certain
ordering between the distribution of bids under common valuation paradigm as the number of
2bidders varies, while the expected value of the object conditional on winning should not vary with
the number of participants under PV.
The methodological contribution of this paper is to extend the structural testing approach from
single-unit auctions to the setting of multi-unit auctions, with which government debt is auctioned
around the world, and to exploit a diﬀerent source of variation in our data to base our test on.
Speciﬁcally, our data set from Canadian treasury bill auctions allows us to observe the modiﬁcations
that a subset of bidders (dealers), make to their submitted bids upon observing the bids of some
of their competitors (customers). Thus, we are able to observe how bids change within an auction
in response to new information about competition. In contrast, the testing strategy utilized in
the literature so far focuses on across-auction responses to changes in the number of competing
bidders. Our within-auction testing strategy makes our results less susceptible to the presence of
unobserved heterogeneity across auctions.
As an example for our testing approach, consider a situation in which bidder i is about to submit
her bid (demand) function yi, but before submitting yi she observes a bid actually submitted by
bidder j. With private valuations bidder i obtains better information about the location and shape
of residual supply she will be facing in the upcoming auction. Using this additional information,
she revises her initial bid yi and submits an alternative bid y′
i. In an auction with interdependent
values or a common value component, on top of the additional information about the location
and shape of the residual supply curve, she also obtains new important information about the
underlying valuation. Therefore she submits a new bid y′′
i taking into account both of these two
pieces of new information. In general, the way she will revise her bid yi will diﬀer under the two
scenarios and this distinction motivates our test.
This paper is also the ﬁrst attempt to conduct an econometric test of a common value component
in government securities auctions. Analysts of these auctions have expressed widely diﬀering beliefs
as to whether the bidding environment is best described as a private value as opposed to a common
value environment. Whereas the earliest theoretical analyses, by Vickrey (1961), Vernon Smith
(1966) have pursued the private value model, later modelling attempts by Wilson (1979), Kyle
3(1985), Bikhchandani and Huang (1989) emphasized the common value component, citing the
existence of a liquid resale market. The structural econometric approach to government securities
auctions is also similarly divided between common and private value paradigms: while Fevrier,
Preguet and Visser (2002) and Armantier and Sbai (2006) base their econometric models on a
pure common value speciﬁcation, other studies, including Horta¸ csu (2002), Kastl (2006a), Kang
and Puller (2006), utilize independent private value models.1 The latter set of papers argue that
for short term debt the private valuation component is probably more important, because most
investors hold these papers in their portfolios until maturity so that there is almost no resale.
However, there is still some controversy in modelling auctions of government debt using private
valuation models. In particular, for example due to diﬀerent expectations of some global risk, say of
interest rate ﬂuctuations, there might still be an important common valuation component involved.
It therefore remains a matter of taste as to which model to apply.
Our paper also provides a structural econometric method to analyze the value of observing
“order ﬂow.” In particular, we use our estimated model to quantify the extra rents that dealers
enjoy from observing the information contained in customers’ orders. Consistently with views of
the practioners we ﬁnd that the customers’ order ﬂow contributes signiﬁcantly to dealers’ overall
proﬁts from participating in primary auctions.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we lay out the model of a
discriminatory auction of a perfectly divisible unit good and characterize the necessary conditions
for equilibrium bidding under private values and restricted strategy sets. We use these necessary
conditions to conduct structural estimation of bidders’ marginal valuations under the null hypoth-
esis. We describe the actual test for common values in Section 3. To evaluate the performance of
the proposed test, we conduct a Monte Carlo simulation in Section 4. In Section 5 we describe two
data sets of Canadian treasury bill auctions (3-months and 12 months maturities) and present the
results of our estimation in Sections 6 and 7. Finally, Section 8 concludes.
1A related set of papers model bidding in electricity auctions (e.g., Wolak (2003, 2005), Horta¸ csu and
Puller (2007)). These researchers share the view that the private value framework seems like an appropriate setting
for these auctions. These papers are relevant to our work as they provide important contribution to current estimation
methods of private value divisible good auctions.
42 The Model and Test Description
The basic model underlying our analysis is based on the share auction model of Wilson (1979) with
private information, in which both quantity and price are assumed to be continuous. There are N
bidders, who are bidding for a share of a perfectly divisible good. Each bidder receives a private
(possibly multidimensional) signal, si, which is the only private information about the underlying
value of the auctioned goods. The joint distribution of the signals will be denoted by F (s).
Assumption 1 Bidder i’s signal si is drawn from a common support [0,1]
M according to an atom-
less marginal d.f. Fi (si) with strictly positive density fi (si).
Winning q units of the security is valued according to a marginal valuation function vi (q,si,s−i).
In the special case of independent private values (IPV), the si’s are distributed independently across
bidders, and bidders’ valuations do not depend on private information of other bidders, i.e., the
valuation has the form vi (q,si). At the estimation stage we will not impose full symmetry, since
we will allow for diﬀerent groups, within which the signal is distributed identically across bidders.
We will impose the following assumptions on the marginal valuation function v( , , ):
Assumption 2 vi (q,si,s−i) is measurable and bounded, strictly increasing in (each component
of) si ∀(q,s−i) and weakly decreasing in q ∀(si,s−i).
We will denote by Vi (q,si,s−i) the gross utility: Vi (q,si,s−i) =
  q
0 vi (u,si,s−i)du. Throughout
the paper we will distinguish between private values and other valuation structures, where bidders’
valuations could be interdependent (for example could have a common value component). The
following deﬁnition states what we understand under these terms using our notation.
Deﬁnition 1 (i) Bidders have private values when ∀i : vi (q,si,s−i) = vi (q,si,).
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5Our deﬁnition of interdependent values simply states that each bidder possesses with positive
probability some private information that is relevant for valuation of each of his rivals. In particular,
in the context of our empirical application it implies that at least some information that banks
(customers) possess is useful for primary dealers’ estimates of the valuation of the underlying
security.
Bidders’ pure strategies are mappings from private signals to bid functions: σi : Si → Y, where
the set Y includes all possible functions y : R+ → [0,1]. A bid function for type si can thus be
summarized by a function, yi ( |si), which speciﬁes for each price p, how big a share yi (p|si) of the
securities oﬀered in the auction (type si of) bidder i demands. Q will denote the amount of T-bills
for sale, i.e., the good to be divided between the bidders. Q might itself be a random variable if it is
not announced by the auctioneer ex ante. In the auctions we study, the Government of Canada has
the right to cancel the auction or restrict the announced supply. We assume that the distribution
of Q is common knowledge among the bidders.
Furthermore, the number of potential bidders participating in an auction, denoted by N, is
also commonly known. This assumption is reasonable in the context of our empirical application
as all participants have to register with the auctioneer before the auction and the list of registered
participants is publicly available. The natural solution concept to apply in this setting is Bayesian
Nash Equilibrium. The expected utility of type si of bidder i who employs a strategy yi ( |si) in a
discriminatory auction given that other bidders are using {yj ( | )}j =i can be written as:
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i (Q,s,y( |s)) is the (market clearing) quantity bidder i obtains if the state (bidders’ private
information and the supply quantity) is (s,Q) and bidders bid according to strategies speciﬁed in
the vector y( |s) = [y1 ( |s1),...,yN ( |sN)], and similarly pc (Q,s,y( |s)) is the market clearing
price associated with state (s,Q). The ﬁrst term in (1) is the gross utility the type si enjoys from
his allocation, the second term is the total payment for all units allocated at steps at which the
6type si was not rationed and the ﬁnal term is the payment for units allocated during rationing. A
Bayesian Nash Equilibrium in this setting is thus a collection of functions such that almost every
type si of bidder i is choosing his bid function so as to maximize his expected utility: yi ( |si) ∈
argmaxEUi (si) for a.e. si and all bidders i.
2.1 Equilibrium strategy of a bidder in a private value auction
In this subsection we describe equilibrium behavior of a bidder in a private value setting. The
discriminatory auction version of Wilson’s model with private values has been previously studied
in Horta¸ csu (2002a). Kastl (2006b) extends this model to empirically relevant setting, in which
bidders are restricted to use step functions with limited number of steps as their bidding strategies.
He proves that an equilibrium in this game exists and provides its characterization via a set of
necessary conditions:
Proposition 1 Suppose values are private, rationing is pro-rata on-the-margin, and bidders can
use at most K steps. Then in any Bayesian Nash Equilibrium of a Discriminatory Auction, for
almost all si, with a bidder of type si submitting ˆ K (si) ≤ K steps, every step k in the equilibrium
bid function yi ( |si) has to satisfy:
(i) ∀k ≤ ˆ K (si) such that v (q,si) is continuous in a neighborhood of qk for a.e. si:
v(qk,si) = bk +
Pr(bk+1 ≥ pc|si)
Pr(bk > pc > bk+1|si)
(bk − bk+1) (2)
(ii) if v(q,si) is a step function in q such that v(q,si) = vk ∀q ∈ (qk−1,qk] for a.e. si, then





Notice that if signals were independent, the probabilities in (2) and (3) would not be conditional
on si, but would still be of course a function of the submitted bid curve.
72.2 Estimation of marginal valuations
Using the necessary conditions (2) and (3), and assuming either continuity of marginal valuation
function in q or assuming v ( ,si) is a step function, we can obtain point estimates of marginal
valuations at submitted quantity-steps nonparametrically as described in Horta¸ csu (2002) and
Kastl (2006a). The resampling method that we employ in these papers is based on simulating
diﬀerent possible states of the world (realizations of the vector of private information) using the
data available to the econometrician and thus obtaining an estimator of the distribution of the
market clearing prices. Speciﬁcally, in the case where all N bidders are ex-ante symmetric and the
data is generated by a symmetric Bayesian Nash equilibrium, the resampling method operates as
follows:
Fix a bidder. From the observed data, draw (with replacement) N − 1 actual bid functions
submitted by bidders. This simulates one possible state of the world from the perspective of the
ﬁxed bidder, a possible vector of private information, and thus results in one potential realization
of the residual supply. Intersecting this residual supply with the ﬁxed bidder’s bid we obtain a
market clearing price. Repeating this procedure large number of times we obtain an estimate of
the full distribution of the market clearing price conditional on the ﬁxed bid. Using this estimated
distribution of market clearing price, we can obtain our estimates of valuation at each step submitted
by the bidder whose bid we ﬁxed using (2) or (3) depending on the assumption on the marginal
valuation function we are willing to impose.
We now discuss how we can adapt this method into the present context where some bidders (the
“dealers”) observe the bids of others (“customers”). Suppose there are two classes of bidders: Nd
potential dealers (in index set D) and Nc potential customers (in index set C). Customers observe
private signals, s, which are iid across customers, with marginal distribution FC(s). Each dealer
also observes a private signal, s. Dealers also observe an additional piece of “orderﬂow” information,
z. z may equal the customer bid observed by that dealer, or is null when the dealer does not observe
any additional information. We assume that z is not observed by the dealer’s competitors, but is
observed by the econometrician. Let FD(s1,...,sNd,z1,..,zNd) be the joint distribution of dealer
signals and orderﬂow information. We assume that (si,zi) are iid across dealers i ∈ D.
8Given the symmetry assumptions, we will assume that the bidding data is generated by a
Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the game in which customers submit bid functions that are symmetric
up to their private signals, i.e. yi(p,si) = yC(p,si), i ∈ C. Dealers’ bid functions are also symmetric,
but up to their private signal and order ﬂow information, i.e. yi(p,si,zi) = yD(p,si,zi), i ∈ D.
With this equilibrium assumption, the distribution of the market clearing price, as observed by
a dealer, i, for whom zi = ∅ is given by:











where E{.} is the expectation over the relevant random variables, and I(.) is the indicator function.
If dealer i instead observes customer m’s bid function, i.e. zi = {yC(p,sm),∀p},












The resampling algorithm used by Horta¸ csu (2002) and Kastl (2006a) should thus be modiﬁed
in the following manner: to estimate the probability in (4), we draw Nc customer bids from the
set of observed customer bids (to which we have added zero bids for non-participating customers).
Conditional on the customer bid drawn, draw a dealer’s bid as follows: (i) If a zero customer bid is
drawn, draw from the pool of dealers’ bids, which have been submitted without observing any bid
by the customers, or (ii) If a non-zero customer bid is drawn, draw from the pool of dealers’ bids,
which have been submitted having observed the same customer bid. After drawing Nc customer
bids, continue drawing from the pool of bids submitted by uninformed dealers until Nd dealer bids
are drawn. Obtain the market clearing price and repeat.
Performing such a conditional drawing procedure, unfortunately, has the limitation that cus-
tomer bids are typically unique within or across auctions. Thus, the “conditional” draws often
consist of repeatedly drawing the same customer and “informed” dealer pair. Of course, asymp-
totically, we expect the number of dealer bids corresponding to a given customer bid to increase;
9however, in small samples, this is rarely true. We may thus consider a “smoothing” strategy sim-
ilar to nonparametric regression techniques: instead of drawing informed dealer bids that exactly
correspond to a given customer bid, draw bids from dealers who saw customer bids that are “close”
to the given customer bid.
Indeed, an extreme case of this “smoothing” strategy, which serves as a robustness check to
the “unsmoothed” algorithm we provide above, is to perform an unconditional simulation: when
drawing from dealer bids, we ﬁrst ﬂip a coin to determine whether this dealer has hypothetically
seen a customer’s bid or not, where the coin is biased such that it reﬂects the actual probability
of a dealer observing a customer’s bid. If the coin determines that a customer bid has been seen,
then we draw (uniformly) from the set of updated informed dealer bids, otherwise we draw from
the set of “uninformed” dealer bids. This is performed for each of Nd potential dealer draws, i.e.,
independently of the customer bids actually drawn in a given simulation round.
To estimate the probability in (5), we modify the above procedure slightly: ﬁxing a dealer, who
has seen a customer bid, we draw Nc − 1, not Nc, customer bids, and take the observed customer
bid along with the dealer’s own bid as given when calculating the market clearing price.
Applying the conditional resampling procedure for a dealer that we observe both before and
after receiving a customer bid therefore results in two sets of marginal valuation estimates – and our
test will be based on comparing the two sets of marginal valuation estimates. One caveat involved
in constructing this test is that the bids before and after the information about rival’s bid arrives
are not necessarily submitted for the same quantities(even though for a subset of bidders in our
sample updated bids are submitted at the same quantities), and hence we will face an inference
problem of how to compare the two sets of estimates. We will discuss these issues and the solutions
in Section 3 of the paper which deals with the test speciﬁcation.
Note that the necessary conditions described in Proposition 1 apply only to dealers, whose bids
are not revealed to anyone. We base our test exclusively on the behavior of dealers. Of course,
customers may have a (potentially complex) strategic response to the fact their bids are observed by
dealers. This may generate an alternative testing strategy: the equilibrium eﬀect of how a bidder
adjusts her bid when she knows that her bid will be observed by her rival is likely to diﬀer when
10values are private and when values are interdependent. We do not pursue this approach, however,
and only utilize the (empirical) distribution of customer bids to characterize dealers’ best-responses.
2.3 Asymptotic Distribution of the Estimates
As suggested above our test will be based on comparing two sets of estimates. Therefore, we have
to be able to account for the sampling error when constructing our test statistic and deriving its
asymptotic distribution. Let us ﬁrst look at the asymptotic behavior of the estimates of marginal
valuation. It is easy to see from equation (2) that these estimates are a non-linear function of the
distribution of the market clearing price, which is estimated by the resampling method described
above. Let us rewrite (2) as
v (qk,si) = bk +
H (bk+1)
G(bk) − H (bk+1)
(bk − bk+1)
where H (X) (resp. G(X)) is the probability that market clearing price is weakly (resp. strictly)
lower than X.
To establish the asymptotic distribution of the resampling estimator ˆ HR, let us ﬁrst focus on
the case where we have data from T auctions with N symmetric bidders, where the observed vector
of bid functions {yit(p,sit),i = 1,..,N,t = 1,..T} are iid draws from the same distribution.
Proposition 2 Let ˆ HR (X) denote the resampling estimator. N number of bidders in an auc-
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and where that last summation is taken over all combinations of N−1 indices αi ∈ {(1,1),(1,2),...,(1,N−
1),...,(T,N − 1)} such that α1 < α2 < ... < αN−1.2
2The asymptotic distribution of the resampling estimator ˆ G
R can be established analogously, by replacing the
weak inequality in the deﬁnition of Φ(·) by a strict one.
















where ˆ F is the empirical distribution of bid functions. θ is a U-statistic and the result thus follows
from applying Theorem 7.1 of Hoeﬀding (1948) which provides a useful version of a central limit
theorem for this class. A suﬃcient condition for asymptotic normality is the existence of the






, which is satisﬁed since Φ( ) is an indicator function. The resampling estimator, as it is


















where the averaging is over every permutation of the NT observations (since this is not computa-
tionally feasible, we approximate this average by Monte Carlo sampling). Lehmann (1999, Theorem
6.2.2, p.388) shows that the asymptotic distribution of this V-statistic is identical to that of the
U-statistic.
The resampling estimator that we described for the probabilities in equations (4) and (5) are
slightly diﬀerent in that the bid functions yit are drawn from asymmetric distributions (but Φ( ) is
still a symmetric function of its elements). Hoeﬀding (1948), Theorem 8.1, extends the asymptotic
normality result to the case where all yit are allowed to have diﬀerent distributions. This extension
requires a slightly stronger condition on the third moment of Φ( ) to use the Liapunoﬀ Central Limit
Theorem, but this condition is still satisﬁed since Φ( ) is an indicator function which is uniformly
bounded.
Using the asymptotic variance of the distribution of the market clearing prices, H(X) (and
G(X)), we can use the delta-method to derive the asymptotic variance of the estimates of the
marginal valuations, i.e., V ar(ˆ vk) = J
′
vΣJv, where Jv is the matrix of partial derivatives with
12respect to H (bk+1), H (bk) and G(bk+1) and Σ is the asymptotic variance/covariance matrix for
those estimates. How do we obtain the asymptotic covariance matrix of {H (c1),H (c2),G(c3)} at
particular three values of c? An advantage of Hoeﬀding’s theorem is that it applies also to vector-
valued random variables and the oﬀ-diagonal elements of the asymptotic variance/covariance matrix
are the asymptotic covariances between two corresponding U-statistics.
Instead of using the asymptotic normal approximation, we can also use bootstrap conﬁdence
intervals, which are readily generated by iteraring the resampling scheme used for point estimates
on bootstrap samples of the bid data. The following proposition establishes the validity of bootstrap
in our setting.






















where ζ is as deﬁned in Proposition 2.
Proof. The result follows from Theorem 3.1 of Bickel and Freedman (1981) using the fact that the
variance and any covariances of our kernel Φ(y1,...,yN−1) in the U-statistic θ(F;c) are bounded.
2.4 Equilibrium strategy of a bidder in an auction with interdependent or com-
mon values
If the valuation of a bidder has a common value component, then we will not be able to replicate
the updating process of this bidder as new information becomes available to him. While the
updating part due to better information about the location and shape of the residual demand
is still the same as in the private value setting, there is a second updating component due to
the additional information about the signal of a rival and hence about the underlying value. In
particular, the necessary condition for optimality at kth step in an interdependent value environment
13is (if v (q,si,s−i) is continuous in a neighborhood of qk for a.e. (si,s−i)):

















In other words, we have the familiar trade-oﬀ in a discriminatory auction that occurs even with
private values: marginally shading the quantity demanded at kth step results on the one hand










in the states that exactly that
quantity would be won in. On the other hand it results in saving of bk − bk+1 whenever the
market clearing price is lower than the bid at the next quantity step. But now, because of the
interdependent values, there is an additional eﬀect summarized by the function γ( ): marginally
shading the quantity at kth step can lead to a diﬀerent slope of expected market clearing price in
the region where kth quantity demand eﬀects the market clearing price or allocation and thus it
can eﬀect the way inference is drawn from the market clearing price realization on the unknown
valuation (through updated information about rival’s signals).






, we cannot identify v(qk,si,s−i)
non-parametrically without imposing more structure as without knowing more about v(qk,si,s−i),
we cannot identify the additional updating eﬀect captured in γ( ).
Thus, we cannot unambiguously sign the bias in the estimate of the marginal valuation if
we were to use the identiﬁcation equation (1) from the private value model and the true model
were interdependent values. This is in contrast to Haile, Hong and Shum, who can establish
a relationship (under the alternative hypothesis) between the estimated distributions of private
valuations in terms of stochastic dominance as the number of bidders increases. Therefore our
testing strategy will focus on the null hypothesis of private value setting.
3 Test Speciﬁcation
The fact that in the treasury bill auction of the Canadian government a subset of bidder (dealers)
submit bids on behalf of other bidders (customers) and that these bids are visible to the econo-
14metrician provides a unique environment for testing for the presence of a common component in
bidders’ valuations which are not observed by the econometrician. In particular, dealers sometimes
submit their own bids, but after fulﬁlling a request of one or more of their customers to submit a
bid on their behalf, they decide to adjust their previously submitted bid. Since we observe the bid
both before and after the additional information was made available to the dealer, the private value
assumption becomes testable. In a pure private valuation setting any such bid adjustment should
be driven solely by more information about the residual supply that this bidder will be facing in
the actual auction. In a setting with a common valuation component, the adjustment reﬂects both
more information about the residual supply and more information about the common valuation
component, and hence these two adjustment results should be diﬀerent. As mentioned earlier, in
Horta¸ csu (2002) and Kastl (2006a) we proposed nonparametric methods based on simulating rivals’
strategies for estimation of marginal valuations in private value divisible good auctions. We will
utilize these methods to estimate the marginal valuation schedules implied by the initial bid, and
by the updated bid, taking into account the new information about the residual supply. In other
words, as described earlier we are able to mimic the bid updating process under private values
hypothesis, but we are not be able to mimic it under common values. Therefore, under the null
hypothesis of private valuation setting the estimates before and after the additional information
should coincide. Should we ﬁnd that the two marginal valuation schedules are signiﬁcantly diﬀer-
ent, we will reject the null and conclude that the common valuation component plays an important
role in these auctions.
We now discuss several practical challenges that need to be addressed in formulating our testing
strategy.
3.1 Accounting for the Discreteness of Bid Functions
One important practical challenge arises from the fact that bids in multiunit auctions are submitted
as discrete price-quantity pairs. Unfortunately, we can only obtain point-identiﬁcation for marginal
valuations at the discrete price-quantity points, and since bidders may change the discrete bid steps
they submit after they receive extra information, we face the challenge of testing the equality of
15non-point identiﬁed parameters. In the subsequent section we discuss two alternative tests that can
be performed without requiring non-parametric identiﬁcation of the whole level-curve. The ﬁrst
is based on testing for monotonicity of the estimated marginal valuation function and the second
is based on comparing the two sets of estimates of marginal valuations, k = BI,AI, in situation
where a bid has been submitted for the same quantity. For completeness, in appendix A we also
include a test which would be applicable if the researcher believed that the level curves of the
marginal valuation function can be identiﬁed non-parametrically.
3.1.1 Nonparametric Test for Monotonicity
Possibly the most natural way to think about the asymptotics is to consider the number of steps
and thus the number of quantities at which the marginal value can be estimated as ﬁxed, and let
just the number of auctions increase, which is necessary for these estimates to be consistent. Then
we could test for monotonicity of the estimated marginal values at quantities submitted before and
after the additional information as follows: Fix bidder i and pool together the vectors of quantity
demands submitted by this bidder i before and after the information arrival (i.e., steps of her bid
functions) and the associated estimated marginal valuations,
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order the resulting pooled vector by quantity requested at each step: qi1 < qi2 < ... < qi(KBI+KAI)
and let ˆ vi1,..., ˆ vi(KBI+KAI) denote the associated estimated marginal values, which are thus ordered
by quantity. Consider the following test statistic:
Si = max
j
{ˆ vij+1 − ˆ vij,0} (7)
Clearly, when monotonicity is satisﬁed at all quantities, then ˆ vij ≥ ˆ vij+1 and hence Si = 0. On the
other hand we could get violations of monotonicity due to the sampling error in a ﬁnite sample and
hence Si > 0 could be consistent with the null hypothesis. The major advantage of this approach
is that it does not restrict the class of possible marginal valuation functions in any other way than
that it be non-increasing in quantity.
We obtain the critical value for this test statistic using bootstrap.3 Using B bootstrap draws,
3Notice that the test statistic Si is simply the maximum violation of monotonicity for a given set of estimates for
16the critical values are computed as follows:
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(8)
For each bootstrap draw of the test statistic, the marginal valuation is re-estimated by the
resampling method described earlier, where a new sample of bid functions from which this resam-
pling is performed is drawn. To construct a bootstrap sample of bid functions, we have to follow a
procedure similar to the conditional resampling. In constructing these bootstrap samples we need
to include also the ’zero’ bids for those potential bidders that do not end up actually submitting
a bid. We start by drawing Nc customer bids with replacement giving 1
TNc probability to each
(where T ≥ 1 is the number of auctions which we pooled together for resampling). Conditional
on having drawn a non-zero customer’s bid, we draw from the observed sample Nc
d dealer bids
submitted following the same customer’s bid with replacement giving 1
Nc
d
probability to each such
dealer bid. Conditional on drawing a zero customer bid, we draw from dealers’ bids submitted
without knowledge of any customer’s bid putting equal probability on each.
Before adopting this testing approach, however, we should discuss an important shortcoming.
Since our testing for monotonicity via the test statistic S falls into the framework of partial identi-
ﬁcation, there could be situations in which the true model in fact has a common value component
and thus the level curves of (expected) marginal valuation are diﬀerent before and after the infor-
mation is revealed, but our monotonicity test fails to reject the null hypothesis4. In other words,
the monotonicity test proposed above might not be consistent against all alternatives. However,
its special case discussed below is consistent against all alternatives provided that there is some
dependence of a bidder’s payoﬀ on rivals’ information such as the one required in Deﬁnition 1.
More speciﬁcally, asymptotic consistency requires that the common valuation component depends
non-trivially on the information of those bidders whose bid a dealer gets to observe.
bidder i, and not an estimate of a maximum hence bootstrap can be used to approximate its distribution.
4The test may fail to reject possibly even asymptotically as no more points from the level curves might be identiﬁed
due to bidding strategies being step functions.
173.1.2 Equality Test
A special case of the above described monotonicity test can be performed if bids are submitted
at the same quantities before and after the information becomes available. In that case, under
private values the two estimates of marginal valuations should coincide asymptotically and thus









i (q,si) is the estimated marginal valuation for share q before the information was re-
vealed and similarly ˆ vAI
i (q,si) is the estimated marginal valuation for share q after the additional
information arrived. The following proposition reveals an appealing feature of this test.
Proposition 4 (Asymptotic consistency)
Under H1 of interdependent values, Pr
 
Ti (q) > TB
i (q)
 
→ 1 as (the number of auctions) T → ∞
where TB is the critical value obtained by bootstrap.
This special case of our test is thus consistent against all alternatives, since if under any alter-










with probability 1, then the additional knowledge of sj would not contribute any additional infor-
mation about the value at q, which is not consistent with the basic assumption of the interdependent
value model that the (expected) value depends on rivals’ signals.
3.2 Joint hypothesis test
So far we discussed how we can test for common values based on a set of estimated values for
a given bidder, whom we observe submitting a bid before and after information arrives. In our
application, however, we observe multiple such bidders. Therefore, the proper way to test whether
the null hypothesis of private values can be rejected is to test this null jointly for all bidders. The
most direct way to test a joint hypothesis is to adjust the desired p-value to satisfy the Bonferroni
inequality, i.e., instead of comparing each individual hypothesis to a p-value of 0.05, compare it to a
p-value of 0.05
# of hypotheses. This method, while controlling the familywise error rate (type-I errors),
18is usually regarded as being too conservative.5 An alternative way is to construct a test statistic
which take into account all of the tested hypotheses at once. For example, motivated by a χ2 test,











We also construct studentized versions of these test statistics by scaling Si and Ti by their (boot-
strap) standard deviations.
Another test statistic that takes into account all of the hypotheses at once is the maximum







We approximate the asymptotic distribution of these test statistics again by bootstrap.6 For
example, in the case of SQ, the null hypothesis of private values is rejected on level α, when
ˆ SQ > SQ1−α, where ˆ SQ is the sample value of the statistic, and SQ1−α is the (1 − α)
th quantile
of the boostrap distribution of the test statistic.
3.3 Aﬃliated values
As in Haile, Hong and Shum (2003), our test is, in principle, able to distinguish between a private
value model (with or without independent signals) and a model with a common valuation com-
ponent. The estimation procedure would have to be adapted in the aﬃliate private values case,
however, since with aﬃliated signals we would have to resample other bids conditional on signal
bidder i observes (i.e., resample whole vectors of bids by other bidders submitted in auctions in
which i submitted the same bid). While this would not cause problem for the asymptotic behavior,
5See Romano, Shaikh and Wolf (2008) for more detailed discussion on multiple testing.
6Note that in FOSS and FOST, the maximum is taken over the number of dealers, which is ﬁxed as the data set
gets larger. Thus bootstrap is not problematic.
19in a ﬁnite sample this test would greatly reduce the number of states (vectors of private informa-
tion) that can be simulated since almost no bidder would be observed submitting the exact same
bid in multiple auctions. Therefore, in our empirical application we will specify our null hypothe-
sis as independent private values and the alternative would thus encompass both a model with a
common value component and a private value model with aﬃliated signals.
3.4 Unobservable heterogeneity across auctions
Another practical challenge in implementing the testing procedure is the presence of auction-level
covariates that are observed by the bidders, but not by the econometrician. For example, the test
for common values in a single unit setting proposed in Haile, Hong and Shum (2003) relies on the
ability of the econometrician to observe repetitions of the same experiment over time, where the
number of competing bidders varies exogenously across auctions. If there are auction characteristics
that are unobserved by the econometrician, but observed by (potential) bidders, this may lead to
biased test results when bidders’ participation decisions are driven by such omitted factors.
Our testing strategy is based on looking at modiﬁcation of bids by a given bidder, within the
same auction. Thus, at least in principle, we do not have to rely on across auction information
to construct our test statistic. However, our estimates of marginal valuations (under the null of
independent private values) will be more precise if we can pool bid data across auctions. Pooling
data across auctions, however, may lead to biases in our estimation of bid shading if auction-level
unobservables are present. We will therefore experiment with diﬀerent levels of data pooling.
A more subtle concern regarding omitted variable bias may arise in our application if the changes
in dealer bids are caused by innovations to the bidders’ information set that are not observed by
the econometrician. The presence of such omitted pieces of information biases our estimates of
bidders’ optimal bid shading. We can test for the presence of such omitted information ﬂows if the
information is public, i.e. observed by multiple bidders. In our data, as we observe exact time of
each bid submission, we can distinguish a change in bid due to more information coming from a
customer from a change in bid due to some new public information. In the latter case, conditional
on some small time window, all adjustments by dealers should be positively correlated, whereas in
20the former case they should be independent. Therefore if we subject to our test only those changing
bids that are not accompanied by similar changes in rival’s bids, we can be more conﬁdent that
no commonly observed (but unobserved by us) piece of information is biasing our test. We will be
more explicit about addressing this issue in Section 5 when we discuss the institutional background.
4 Monte Carlo Study
Our ability to test the performance of the above described testing procedure in multiunit auctions
is limited by the fact that in most general cases we do not have closed form solutions for equilibrium
strategies, either in the private or in the aﬃliated values settings. We circumvent this problem by
conducting a set of Monte Carlo exercises in a ﬁrst price auction with independent private values,
with interdependent values and pure common values, where we endow some bidders with the ability
of observing a rival’s bid. As mentioned earlier, the fact that some bidders’ bids might be observed
by their rivals is likely to have an equilibrium eﬀect on the formation of these bids to begin with.
Since we want to focus on the updating of bids associated with gaining information contained
in a rival’s bid, we instead consider Monte Carlo exercises where we shut down this equilibrium
adjustment eﬀect caused by the bid being revealed to a rival. In particular, in all examples, we
generate the data from an equilibrium model of bidding with 3 bidders, where bidder 1 is a strategic
player while bidders 2 and 3 are automatons playing as in a sealed bid ﬁrst price auction with 3
bidders. We non-parametrically estimate the marginal values (of bidder 1) implied by the bids
using Guerre, Perrigne and Vuong (2002) (henceforth GPV). In line with the spirit of the test
we propose we assume that bidder 1 observes bidder 2’s bid and submits an updated bid which
supersedes her original bid. We generate the data from an equilibrium bidding function, which of
course diﬀers from the regular FPSB auction with 3 bidders. We again estimate the implied values
of (informed) bidder 1 as if he were facing one less rival using GPV which assumes private values.
We construct our test statistics described in the previous section and bootstrap the critical values.
214.1 First Price Auction with Informed Bidders
4.1.1 Independent private values (IPV)
The ﬁrst exercise we consider is a ﬁrst price auction with 3 bidders, valuations v (si) = si and
signals distributed uniformly on [0,1]. The unique equilibrium in strictly increasing diﬀerentiable
strategies when all bidders are uninformed is bU(si) = 2
3si. Now consider the case that bidder 1
would be able to observe bidder 2’s bid and bidders 2 and 3 are automatons that continue to bid










3 if s1 > 2s2
3 > s1
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Figure 1 compares the estimated valuations of a bidder before and after she is informed. The
ﬁgure suggests that except at the boundaries of the support of the bid/valuation distribution, the
valuation estimated with and without conditioning on observed information is likely to be very
close. To correct the behavior at the boundaries, some adjustment would be necessary due to the
bias in the kernel estimation, which we do by trimming 1
9 of the estimated valuations on the bottom
and 2
9 of the estimated valuations on the top.7
Of course, this ﬁgure depicts what happens only in one randomly chosen data set on bids. We
then implement a joint test of the null hypothesis of the private values using randomly drawn data
sets. We begin with testing for the equality of the median of estimated valuation distributions be-
fore and after information is received. In particular, in the ﬁrst column of Table 1, we calculate the
diﬀerence in the median of the distributions of valuations, Med(ˆ vinformed) − Med(ˆ vuninformed),
in each Monte Carlo sample and construct the 2.5th and 97.5th bootstrap quantiles (using 400
resamples of the Monte Carlo data set) of these diﬀerences (re-centering the boostrap distri-
bution by the test statistic computed on the original sample). The null hypothesis is rejected
when the sample test statistic is not within this conﬁdence interval. To make use of the fact
that we observe two bids by the same bidder type, we also construct the “sum of squared dif-
7As the ﬁgure suggests, the estimation bias arises mostly in the upper tail of the distribution and therefore we
focus the trimming there. Trimming at the lower tail does not aﬀect the results of our Monte Carlo experiments.
22ferences” test, SQ =
 
i (ˆ vi,informed − ˆ vi,uninformed)
2, and the “ﬁrst order statistic” test, FOS =
maxi (ˆ vi,informed − ˆ vi,uninformed), both of which we described earlier. The rejection probabilities
are reported in the second and third columns of table 1. In order to understand how sampling
error aﬀects the rejection performance, we replicated the exercise for data sets of size 50, 100,
and 200 – which are data sets of similar size to the empirical exercise. The (true) null of IPV is
rejected less than 10% for all the cases for the median and SQ test statistics, with the SQ test
statistic displaying particularly good performance. The FOS appears to overreject the null, and
gives particularly bad results when the data is not trimmed.
Finally, to evaluate an joint hypothesis test , we also report the results of the pointwise test, in
which we compare the absolute value of the diﬀerence between each ˆ vinformed and ˆ vuninformed pair,
to the diﬀerence at a given quantile of the (re-centered) bootstrap distribution of the diﬀerence
between that pair. In particular, we report the percentage of points where we obtain rejection where
each pointwise diﬀerence is compared to the 95th percentile, and to the quantile correponding to
the Bonferroni’s method, 100 − 5
# of hypotheses.
The null rejection frequencies of this alternative testing procedure is displayed in the ﬁrst
two columns of Table 2. While the Bonferroni method is generally regarded as too conservative,
in our setting it still would lead to a wrongful rejection of the null hypothesis, even though it
(unsurprisingly) leads to a large reduction in rejection rates.
4.1.2 First price auction with interdependent values and independent signals (IIV)
In the second exercise we look at a ﬁrst price auction with interdependent values and independent




2(n−1) where si ∼ U[0,1]. The unique
symmetric equilibrium in strictly increasing diﬀerentiable strategies involved bidding according to
bU(si) = 7
12si. In the appendix we show that the equilibrium strategy of an informed bidder who
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Figure 1: Estimated values for informed and uninformed bidders in a FPA with private values
Figure 2 depicts the results of estimating the implied values using GPV for a randomly selected
data set. The null rejection frequencies of the testing procedures utilized in the IPV example are
displayed in Tables 1 and 2. Observe that in this case, the FOS test appears to perform the best,
in that for data sets of size exceeding 100, the test appears to work very well in that it rejects
the null with close to 95% probability. The median and especially the SQ tests have lower power
for smaller data sizes, though with N = 200, their performance increases dramatically. A similar
pattern is observed in the pointwise tests.
In Table 3, we also report the studentized versions of the SQ and FOS test statistics, where
the individual test statistics are scaled by their standard deviation. It appears that studentiza-
tion increases the power of both FOS and SQ for all sample sizes – allowing FOS to reject the
alternative in more than 92% of the time for all sample sizes considered.





























Figure 2: Estimated values for informed and uninformed bidders in a FPA with interdependent
values
4.1.3 First price auction with pure common values
In our third exercise we examine a ﬁrst price auction with pure common values described in
Matthews (1984). Let the utility be ui (si) = v where v ∼ Pareto(α) : g(v) = αv−(α+1) for1 ≤ v ≤
∞ and F(s|v) = s
v.
In this case Matthews shows that there is a unique (symmetric) equilibrium in diﬀerentiable
strictly increasing strategies of the form:
b(s) =
 
(N − 1) + [max{1,s}]
−(N−1)−1






N + α − 1
max{1,s}




(N − 1) + s−N 
N (N + α − 1)
Now if bidder 1 were again to observe bidder 2’s bid, two cases can occur: either he can infer s2 or
that s2 < 1.
Suppose that s2 ≤ s1. Then the optimal bid is as before since no such signal is informative
about realized v conditional on winning (smax is a suﬃcient statistic of the sample (s1,...,sN) for




(N − 1) + s−N
2
 
N (N + α − 1)
In other words, bidder uses just the highest signal he observes to base his bid upon and updates
the prior on the distribution of v using the winning event.
We once again generated data for an informed and an uninformed bidder using the above
described bidding strategies and used GPV to estimate the implied valuations under the null
hypothesis of private values. The results, for a randomly chosen data set, are displayed in Figure 3.
In contrast to the IIV case, the median test appears to perform the best in this case. Figure 3
sheds some light into what might drive this result: it appears that boundary eﬀects are particularly
important in this example. Thus, trimming is particularly eﬀective in increasing the power of SQ
and FOS tests. Note that studentization also helps increase the power of SQ and FOS tests, as
displayed in table 3.
4.1.4 Monte Carlo Summary
Our Monte Carlo exercises reveal several important observations regarding the joint test statistics
FOS and SQ: due to the bias of the kernel estimates, without restricting attention to a subset of
26Table 1: Monte Carlo Exercises: Joint test
Rejection frequency
IPV IIV CV
N Mediana SQb FOSc Median SQ FOS Median SQ FOS
50 0.04 0.00 0.32 0.34 0.00 0.54 0.92 0.04 0.02
100 0.04 0.00 0.66 0.40 0.04 0.98 0.99 0.00 0.00
200 0.10 0.00 0.94 0.72 0.68 0.99 0.99 0.00 0.00
50: trimmedd 0.06 0.00 0.08 0.40 0.02 0.80 0.96 0.10 0.66
100: trimmed 0.02 0.00 0.18 0.64 0.12 0.99 0.99 0.44 0.72
200: trimmed 0.04 0.00 0.24 0.74 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.78 0.92
a Test based on diﬀerence in medians of distributions.
b Test based on sum of squares of individual test statistics.
c Test based on the ﬁrst-order statistic of individual test statistics.
d 1
9 of estimated values discarded at the lower tail,
2
9 in the upper tail.





Bonf Ptwise95 PtwiseBonf Ptwise95 PtwiseBonf
50 0.14 0.01 0.46 0.10 0.79 0.21
100 0.17 0.01 0.60 0.20 0.81 0.53
200 0.21 0.02 0.72 0.43 0.85 0.71
50: trimmedc 0.07 0.01 0.54 0.18 0.95 0.37
100: trimmed 0.09 0.01 0.69 0.33 0.98 0.71
200: trimmed 0.11 0.01 0.76 0.52 0.99 0.92
a Comparing each hypothesis with 95
th percentile of the corresponding asymptotic distribution.





´th percentile of the corresponding asymptotic distribution.
c 1
9 of estimated values discarded at the lower tail,
2
9 in the upper tail.





Stud SQStud FOSStud SQStud FOSStud
50 0.04 0.40 0.08 0.92 0.20 0.96
100 0.00 0.46 0.32 0.99 0.68 0.99
200 0.02 0.84 0.92 0.99 0.99 0.98
50: trimmedc 0.00 0.20 0.12 0.92 0.26 0.99
100: trimmed 0.00 0.16 0.40 0.99 0.88 0.99
200: trimmed 0.00 0.22 0.86 0.99 0.99 0.99
a Test based on sum of squares of studentized individual test statistics.
b Test based on the ﬁrst-order statistic of studentized individual test statistics.
c 1
9 of estimated values discarded at the lower tail,
2
9 in the upper tail.




























Figure 3: Estimated values for informed and uninformed bidders in a FPA with pure common
values
hypotheses which consider bidders with estimated valuations that are likely far enough from the
boundary of the support, the tests can have much lower power in smaller samples than desired.
While the joint hypothesis test based on the ﬁrst-order statistic (FOS) seems to have higher power
against the alternatives considered here, it also over-rejects the correct null unless the extent to
which we trim the estimated marginal values increases substantially. The test based on sum of
squares, SQ, on the other hand, does not over-reject the null, but has lower power against the
alternatives, especially when no trimming is applied. Both tests’ power against the alternative
appears to improve if they are studentized, though studentization leads to a slight amount of
overrejection of the null. We also found that joint hypothesis testing based on multiple independent
hypotheses and the Bonferroni correction does not generate signiﬁcantly better performance than
28FOS or SQ.
Given that the various testing approaches appear to have diﬀerent strengths and weaknesses,
we will present results of all three main testing approaches in our application: (i) individual hy-
pothesis tests, {Si,Ti}
N
i=1, where N is the number of hypotheses, (ii) sum of squares (unstudentized
and studentized), (SQT,SQS), and (iii) ﬁrst-order statistic test (unstudentized and studentized),
(FOSS,FOST).
5 Data and Institutional Background
Treasury bills and other Bank of Canada securities are issued in the primary market through
sealed-bid discriminatory auctions. Bids are submitted electronically and can be revised at any
point before the submission deadline. There are two major groups of potential bidders: government
securities distributors (dealers) and customers. The customers are typically not individual investors.
Many of them are actually large banks that for some reason choose not to be registered as a dealers,
but whose demands are suﬃciently important for the Bank of Canada to require their separate
identiﬁcation. The major distinction between customers and dealers, however, is that customers
cannot bid on their own account in the auction, but have to route their bids through one of the
dealers. The dealers are required to identify bids submitted by customers in the electronic bidding
system.
Our sample consists of all submitted bids in 116 auctions of 3-months treasury bills of the
Canadian government issued between 10/29/1998 and 3/27/2003. The auctions were conducted as
sealed-bid discriminatory price auctions. Along with the set of bids taken into consideration when
making the ﬁnal allocation, we also have the entire record of electronic bid submissions by dealers
(under their own bidder ID and their customers’ IDs) during the bid submission period. Thus, we
are able to observe any modiﬁcations made by the dealers to their own bids up until the bidding
deadline. Each electronic submission has a time stamp, thus we are able to observe whether a
dealer’s bid modiﬁcation was preceded by the entry of a customer bid.
One may wonder why dealers submit their bids before the bidding deadline, and do not wait
until they have seen the bids of their customers. One answer is provided by Horta¸ csu and Sareen
29(2006), who report that customer bids typically come in a very narrow window before the bid
submission deadline. They also report that some dealers’ modiﬁcations to their own bids in response
to these late customer bids narrowly missed the bid submission deadline, and that such missed bid
modiﬁcation opportunities had a negative impact on dealers’ ex-post proﬁts. Moreover, although
some customers appear to be in long-term relationships with their dealers, some of them appear
to change dealers frequently; which may render some customer bids as a surprise. Since entering
bid modiﬁcations is not a very costly activity, the uncertainty in the arrival of customer bids may
render it optimal for the dealers to follow the strategy of entering their best response conditional
on their information set.
Horta¸ csu and Sareen (2006) also report various descriptive measures suggesting that obtain-
ing customer information has a causal impact on dealers’ bidding patterns. They ﬁnd that the
direction of changes in a dealer’s (quantity-weighted price) bid typically follows the direction of
discrepancy between the dealer’s pre-customer information bid, and the customer’s bid. Horta¸ csu
and Sareen point out that both common value and private value models are consistent with their
descriptive patterns, however, and do not conduct tests to distinguish between these informational
environments.
An important potential caveat regarding our testing strategy is that privately observed customer
bids per se are not the causal drivers of observed changes in dealer bids, and that customer bids
are correlated with other unobservable information ﬂows driving modiﬁcations to dealer bids. The
presence of such unobservable information ﬂows would confound our testing strategy, since these
information ﬂows may aﬀect the dealer’s marginal valuation, and/or allow them to observe an extra
piece of information regarding the auction environment that we are not able to account for in our
marginal valuation estimation procedure.
One source of unobservable information ﬂows maybe in the form of news announcements or
market movements during the bidding period that are observed by all dealers, but not the econo-
metrician. To examine the plausibility of such unobserved public information ﬂows, we examined
the timing of changes in dealer bids in our data set. If information ﬂows are publicly observed
across dealers, we should observe some amount of clustering in the timing of bid modiﬁcations in
30our data set. We failed to ﬁnd an important degree of clustering in this dimension – within any 5
minute window around a particular bid updating event, there was at most one other dealer chang-
ing his/her bid (and such a dealer was only found in 40 instances out of the total 213 updated bids
in our sample). This suggests that it is unlikely that customer bids were driven by or accompanied
with important public information releases that are unobservable to us. As a complement to this
ﬁnding, Horta¸ csu and Sareen (2006) report that unobservable public information releases by oﬃcial
sources are highly unlikely, as Bank of Canada and Treasury pay careful attention to avoid public
disclosures during the bidding period.
Along with customer bids, dealers may also adjust their net long-short positions during the
bidding period in the when-issued market. The dealer’s net long/short position may shift his/her
bid and/or her marginal valuation curve independent of the information contained in customers
bid; thus this is a potential confounding factor. Fortunately, the Bank of Canada requires dealers
to report their net positions (short or long) in the when-issued market along with their bids. In our
data, only 13 out of 216 updated bids in 3-month T-bill auctions were accompanied by a change in
the net position of the dealer in the when-issued market. In 12-month T-bill auction, only 7 dealers
(out of 275 updates) also changed their net position. Given that such a small fraction of bids are
subject to this potential confound, we do not think that developments in the when-issued market
aﬀect our test results.
In our analysis, we will use data from both 3 month and 12 month maturity treasury bill
auctions. These securities are sold at the same time in parallel auctions, and are the most frequently
auctioned securities in our data. Moreover, our prior is that the role played by common vs. private
value components is likely to be diﬀerent across these securities. In particular, we expect the
common value component for 12-month treasury bills to be relatively more important. 12 month
treasury bills could be used as a hedging instrument in a larger array of transactions, hence have a
more active resale market. Moreover, bidders forecasts’ regarding the economic environment over
the next 12 months period is likely to have higher variance than their forecasts over 3 months.
Hence, there may be higher value in learning other bidders’ forecasts to assess the fundamental
value of a 12 month security, as compared to valuing a 3 month security.
315.1 Summary Statistics
Table 4 oﬀers some summary statistics of our data set, which encompasses all submitted bids in
116 auctions of 3-months treasury bills of the Canadian government issued between 10/29/1998
and 3/27/2003.
Table 4: Data Summary
Summary Statistics for 3 month T-bill auctions
Auctions 116
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Dealers 12.34 1.64 9 15
Customers 4.66 2.3 0 12
Participants 17 2.83 11 23
Submitted steps 2.88 1.69 1 7
Price bid 989,353 3,244 984,515 994,969
Quantity bid 0.092 0.07 0.00023 0.2512
Issued Amount (billions C$) 3.881 0.552 2.8 5
On average, 12 dealers and less than 5 customers participate in every auction. An average bid
curve constists of less than 3 steps and the average quantity demand is for about 10% of the supply.
As usual in most government securities auctions, bids can be submitted both as competitive
tenders and as noncompetitive tenders. Each participant is allowed to submit a single noncom-
petitive tender. A noncompetitive tender speciﬁes a quantity that the bidder wishes to purchase
at the price at which the auction clears. As Table 5 reveals, in our data, there are on average 3.6
noncompetitive tenders in an auction of the preannounced amount for sale. The non-competitive
bids which simply operate by shifting the available supply at any price to the left are not as im-
portant in Canadian treasury bill auctions as in other settings. In particular, while the average
non-competitive bid is for about 4.4% of the supply, most of this is driven by non-competitive bids
that were placed by the central bank itself. The average non-competitive bid conditional on being
placed by a dealer or a customer is for less than 0.06% of the supply and hence quite negligible. In
our estimation approach we thus resample a non-competitive bid from the central bank and then
we also resample either 2 or 3 non-competitive bids from regular participants. All these resampled
bids then shift the available supply to the left.
32Table 5: Summary of Noncompetitive Bids
Auctions with NC bid 116
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Number of NC bids 3.6 1.1 2 7
NC bid 0.044 0.08 0.00003 0.27
Table 6 presents the summary statistics for the 12 month T-bill auctions. Relative to auctions
of 3-months treasury bills (which are sold in parallel auctions), there is less participation both by
dealers and especially by customers. Price bids exhibit larger variation. The amount oﬀered for
sale in each auction is also signiﬁcantly lower.
Table 6: Data Summary
Summary Statistics for 12 month T-bill auctions
Auctions 116
Mean St.Dev. Min Max
Dealers 5.69 0.76 4 8
Customers 2.84 1.78 0 8
Participants 8.53 1.93 5 15
Submitted steps 2.91 1.69 1 7
Price bid 958,997 10,972 940,004 979,928
Quantity bid 0.096 0.074 0.00028 0.25
Issued Amount (billions C$) 1.67 0.194 1.3 2
6 Test results from 3 month T-bill auctions
In the 116 3 month T-bill auctions in our sample, we observed 216 dealer bids that were updated
after a customer bid arrived. Figure 4 depicts updating of a bid by one dealer. After observing a
relatively low bid by one customer, the dealer submits a new bid which is uniformly weakly below
his original bid.8
Before updating, these 216 bids consisted of 802 bidsteps (price-quantity pairs) and after up-
dating they consisted of 859 bidsteps. We focus on these updated bids to conduct our tests. We
construct a bootstrap sample of 400 replications of the test statistics (using always 5000 resampling
8This “parallel shift” of the updated bid is not a general feature of the data, however. Some updated bids cross
the original bids.



























Figure 4: Updating of a dealer’s bid
draws for estimating each bidder’s marginal valuation) for each of these bidders as deﬁned by (7)
and construct the corresponding critical values given by (8).
To illustrate the marginal valuation estimation procedure, ﬁgures 5 and 6 depict the marginal
valuation estimation results for two dealers. In ﬁgure 6 we depict a bidder for whom the two
estimates of marginal valuations are statistically indinstinguishable, while in ﬁgure 5 we depict
a bidder for whom the equality of estimated marginal valuations when information is taken into
account can be rejected at one of his steps. We do not use (or plot) the estimates of the marginal
value at the last step of the bid curve since as proposition 1 shows bid at that step depends on the
properties of the marginal valuation function.
To construct the various testing statistics, we ﬁrst estimated bidder’s marginal valuations under
diﬀerent data pooling schemes. We ﬁrst used resamples of bids from the same auction only (the
“1 auction” case). This does not pool bid data across auctions, and hence minimizes a potential
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Figure 5: Estimated valuations - dealer 1
unobserved heterogeneity problem. However, since the data set used to estimate marginal valuations
is small, the estimation error is potentially large, and, as in our Monte Carlo exercises, the power
of our tests might be lower than desired. Resampling from a pooled set of auctions that are
similar may decrease estimation error, but unobserved heterogeneity across auctions may result in
rejections of the null hypothesis for other reasons. To explore this tradeoﬀ, we report the same
estimates that are obtained if we pool data across 2 and 4 consecutive auctions respectively (this
assumes that the economic environment is stable across 2 and 6 week periods, respectively).
Our Monte Carlo exercise suggested that the various testing approaches utilize have comple-
mentary size-power tradeoﬀs in small samples, thus we will display results across an array of test
statistics. In Table 7, we report results from hypothesis tests on individual bidders’ updating be-
havior. First, we report results based on the monotonicity tests statistic (7) computed separately
for each updated bid (the critical values were obtained using bootstrap). We ﬁnd that we are
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Figure 6: Estimated valuations - dealer 6
able to reject the null (at the 5% level) only in 1% of the individual hypotheses when we estimate
marginal valuations using data from a single auction. When we increase the number of auctions in
used to estimate marginal valuations, we are able to reject more of the individual hypotheses: 6%
of the individual hypotheses are rejected when we resample from 2 neighboring auctions, and 15%
are rejected when we resample from 4 neighboring auctions.
The individual hypothesis tests suggest that the null of private values is not overwhelmingly
rejected. It appears that as we increase the size of the sample used to estimate marginal valuations,
the rejection rates increase. However, as we noted earlier, increasing sample size may lead to
overrejection of the null due to the introduction of unobserved heterogeneity as well. We should
also recall from the Monte Carlo exercise that, in ﬁnite samples, this testing approach may lead to
overrejection of the null even without the presence of unobserved heterogeneity.
In table 8, we report results from the tests based on the joint test statistics deﬁned in Section 3.2.
36Once again, we estimate marginal valuations using 1, 2, and 4 neighboring auctions. Especially
in the case where we were resampling from a single auction, we found that the unstudentized test
statistics were aﬀected by large outliers resulting from marginal value estimation error. We thus
decided to studentize the test statistics.9 Recall that the Monte Carlo exercise suggested that
studentization leads to a slight degree of overrejection of the null hypothesis, but, overall, increases
power against the alternatives.
For each case, we use the bootstrap to calculate the critical values of the studentized ﬁrst-order
test statistic (FOS) and the sum-of-squared diﬀerences statistic (SQ).10 Based on the studentized
joint hypothesis tests and using the treasury bill with 3-months maturity, table 8 shows that we
reject the null hypothesis only when resampling from 4 auctions.11
7 Test results from 12 month T-bill auctions
Tables 7 and 8 also include the results of our tests using updated dealer bids from 12 month auctions.
There were 275 updated dealer bids in this sample, comprising of consisted of 937 bidsteps (price-
quantity pairs) and after updating they consisted of 996 bidsteps.
We suggested above that the common value component maybe more important relative to the
3-months treasury bills. Our data provides some evidence supporting this hypothesis.
On the full sample, the median value of the test statistic for monotonicity violation using
resampling from 4 auctions is 86.33 while the median critical value is 164.94. The median value of
the test statistic for the equality of marginal valuations is 55.56 while the median critical value is
67.79. Overall, table 7 shows that based on individual hypothesis testing the test of equal marginal
9We found similar results when we constructed our test statistics using marginal value estimates with variance
below certain cutoﬀs. However, the choice of these cutoﬀs was subjective; we thus decided to focus on the studentized
test statistic.
10For example, the joint hypothesis test based on the ﬁrst order statistic is constructed by ﬁrst dividing each
individual test statistic evaluated on the sample by its standard deviation estimated by bootstrap and then taking
the maximum of these.
11There is one additional rejection based on the ﬁrst order statistic and resampling from only 1 auction. This is
due to one outlier. In particular, there is one hypothesis that has a very small standard deviation of the bootstrap
distribution of the associated test statistic, which leads to high values of the studentized test statistic. The value
of the studentized test statistic associated with this hypothesis then becomes the ﬁrst order statistic both on the
sample, and also in almost all bootstrap iterations, and thus after re-centering the bootstrap distribution we reject
the null. When we test all other hypotheses jointly (after eliminating the outlying one), all of our tests fail to reject
the null of private values.
37valuations rejects for 19% of steps and the monotonicity test rejects 20% of the hypotheses for
treasury bill with 12-months maturity.
The joint hypothesis tests based on studentized test statistics, results of which are reported in
table 8, show that virtually all performed tests result in lower critical values and larger values of
the test statistic in case of t-bills with 12-months maturity than for t-bills with 3-months maturity.
In particular, for resampling from only two auctions, we never reject the null of private values
based on the joint hypothesis test for 3-months t-bills, whereas we always reject private values for
12-months t-bills.
Table 7: Individual Hypothesis Test Results
Used for resampling 1 auction 2 auctions 4 auctions
Maturity 3-m 12-m 3-m 12-m 3-m 12-m
Monotonicity
# of hypotheses 174 214 193 240 196 240
Rejection rate 0.01 0.04 0.06∗ 0.15∗ 0.15∗ 0.20∗
Equality
# of hypotheses 431 421 448 458 452 461
Rejection rate 0.03 0.07∗ 0.07∗ 0.15∗ 0.15∗ 0.19∗
* Null hypothesis of private values is rejected at 5% level.
Table 8: Joint Hypothesis Studentized Test Results
Used for resampling 1 auction 2 auctions 4 auctions
Maturity 3-m 12-m 3-m 12-m 3-m 12-m
Monotonicity
Critical value (SQa) 513.03 331.72 569.02 557.18∗ 187.84∗ 535.37∗
Sample statistic (SQ) 13.77 132.25 107.56 706.82∗ 1055.77∗ 1130.97∗
Critical value (FOSb) 15.48 7.43 14.95 3.26∗ 2.71∗ 2.23∗
Sample statistic (FOS) 2.53 6.52 4.98 11.32∗ 15.53∗ 12.19∗
Equality
Critical value (SQ) 1158.02 852.37 1346.62 928.10∗ 858.00∗ 672.16∗
Sample statistic (SQ) 483.20 500.86 555.81 1527.45∗ 1751.11∗ 2212.38∗
Critical value (FOS) 3.14∗ 1.45∗ 10.06 2.68∗ 7.35∗ 2.45∗
Sample statistic (FOS) 16.76∗ 12.70∗ 9.89 18.60∗ 12.42∗ 12.92∗
a Test based on sum of squares.
b Test based on ﬁrst-order statistic.
* Null hypothesis of private values is rejected at 5% level.
387.1 Value of Information
Given that several of our tests failed to reject private values for 3-months treasury bills, in what
follows we will use our estimates of marginal valuations generated by assuming the private values
paradigm to estimate the value of information. In particular, we try to answer the question what





denote the ex post utility of a dealer d, when submitting a bid BI where the superscript I
denotes information. In particular, as before I = AI denotes additional information is incorporated,
i.e., when the updated bid is used to compute the utility, and I = BI when the original bid is used
instead.
We can measure the value of information in terms of this notation as follows:
V IEP
d = UEP
d (BAI) − UEP
d (BBI) (14)
To compute the value of information given by equation (14), for each bidder we take the upper
envelope of her estimated marginal valuations and the actual realized residual supply this bidder
faced in the auction. We then evaluate this bidder’s ex-post utility using the original bid (submitted
before the arrival of the customer’s bid) to obtain UEP
d (BBI) and then evaluate her utility using
the updated bid to obtain UEP
d (BAI). Performing this exercise for each bidder whom we observe
updating her bid, we obtain a full distribution of the value of information, the mean of which we
call value of information. Using these estimates we ﬁnd that that the ex post value of information,
V IEP, is on average about 0.44 of a basis point per T-bill for sale12. Since the average ex post utility
amounts to 1.36 basis points, the extra information contained in customers’ order ﬂow generates
about 32% of the payoﬀ of the dealers. We conclude from this analysis that consistently with
views of professionals from the ﬁnancial industry the information that the primary dealers obtain
from the order ﬂow from their customers is an important source of valuable private information
that enables the primary dealers to extract more information rents from participating in primary
auctions even when values are private.
12The standard deviation of ex post payoﬀ is slightly over 2.5 basis points.
398 Conclusion
In this paper we proposed a novel nonparametric test for common values. The test can be applied
universally in both single-unit ﬁrst-price auctions and multiunit auctions. On the other hand a
necessary condition for the test to be applicable is the ability of the researcher to distinguish between
more and less informed bidders, who are ex ante symmetric. The test is based on comparing two
estimated distribution of valuations, which should coincide under the null hypothesis of private
values. Our Monte Carlo experiments suggest that the test performs well. We also apply our
test to data from Canadian treasury bill auctions. While we cannot conclusively reject the null
hypothesis of private values for 3-month treasury bills, in the majority of our test speciﬁcations,
we can reject the null of private values for 12 month treasury bills.
Since we compare two estimates of valuations within an auction, our test is less susceptible
to unobserved heterogeneity of individual auctions than the recent alternative test for common
values proposed in Haile, Hong and Shum (2003). We also used our structural model to quantify
the beneﬁts accruing to the dealers from observing customers’ order ﬂow. Using our valuation
estimates we estimated the value of information by comparing the (expected) utility of a dealer
with customer information to that of the same dealer without this information. We found that
information coming from customers’ order ﬂow is responsible for about 32% of dealer’s surplus.
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A Appendix
A.1 Test for Equality of Nonparametric Regressions
Because there is an estimation error in the estimates of marginal valuations, we can write the
estimated marginal valuation function of bidder i as:
vI





ik for I = BI,AI
where BI and AI stands for “before information” and ”after information” respectively and εI
ik is
the estimation error in marginal valuation estimates, i.e., vi (qik, ¯ s) = ˆ vi (qik, ¯ s) + εik with ˆ v being
the estimates of marginal valuation from our resampling procedure. Since our estimate of marginal
value at quantity qi is consistent, E (ε|q) = 0, and hence the level curve of the marginal valuation




would be nonparametrically identiﬁed whenever the number of observed
43bids at diﬀerent quantities for this particular signal level would go to inﬁnity. Unfortunately, it
is reasonable to believe that this assumption which is necessary for consistency of nonparametric
regression might be violated in practice, since the quantity demands at submitted bids are not a
random selection from the support of quantities. Therefore, we might not observe bids at some
quantities even asymptotically.
Suppose that the whole level curves of the marginal valuation function are non-parametrically
identiﬁed. Under the null hypothesis of private values, fBI = fWI and hence we can simply test for
equality of two nonparametric regressions. Few of such tests have been proposed in the statistics














(η (qB,i) + η(qW,j))ρ(vB,i − vW,j)wa (qB,i − qW,j)
where a is a small positive number depending on the sample sizes. H0 is rejected for large values
of T. Koul and Schick call this test a covariate-matched test.
The test statistic considered above assumes that for any given level curve of the marginal
valuation function v(q,¯ s) at an unobserved signal ¯ s, the set of quantities at which the value is
estimated grows asymptotically, so that v (q, ¯ s) can be identiﬁed nonparametrically. The test then
rejects H0 if the two estimated regression curves are suﬃciently diﬀerent. As mentioned in the text,
in practice, however, the number of steps in the observed bids is very low and there is no compelling
reason to believe that it would vary much as the number of observed auctions increases (for a given
unobserved signal realization ¯ s). One possibility to obtain the asymptotic behavior consistent with
the construction above is to assume private cost c per bidpoint as in Kastl (2006a), which is drawn
independently of s. As c ↓ 0, bidders would submit bids with more and more steps (a continuous
function in the limit of zero cost) for any s and thus v(q, ¯ s) would again be nonparametrically
identiﬁed.
44B Appendix
Here we present the derivation of the closed form solution for bidding used to generate data in our
Mont Carlo studies with 3 bidders.
B.1 First price auction with independent private values
Let the utility function be:
ui = xi
In this case bidder 1 maximizes Pr(b1 > max{b2,b3})(x1−b1) which implies that the symmetric





If he observed 2’s bid, he would bid in 2 cases (assuming any tie is broken in 1’s favor and










3 if x1 > 2x2
3 > x1
2
where the second case occurs whenever bid of bidder 1 using the rule for the ﬁrst case would be
lower than 2’s bid, but bidder 1 would prefer to win the object.
B.2 First price auction with interdependent values
















45Now suppose that bidders 2 and 3 follow these strategies. Suppose bidder 1 can observe bidder
2’s bid. Since 2’s strategy is strictly increasing, bidder 1 can recover the signal s2. In this case,

























Finally, this bid is weakly higher than b2 = 7
12s2 if and only if s1 ≥ 4
3s2. In the case that b2 is
higher than b∗ (s1,s2), bidder 1 will still prefer to win if s1 ≥ 25
48s2.
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